This may be because a dissimilar therapist provides a role model for clients along dimensions that are relevant to the clients' problems. Matching of behaviors other than NLP may also increase rapport in the therapist-client relationship, increasing the therapist's influence. However, some types of mismatching e.
Clearly, the possibilities for using matching or mismatching to increase a therapist's influence over a client have not been adequately explored. Conclusions Research and theory on substantive matching suggests that matching on a wide variety of dimensions and behavior may increase influence over another person. One mechanism by which matching has this effect is by causing the other to like the matcher, consequently increasing influence.
Research on matching of attitudes and nonverbal behaviors is especially consistent with this conclusion. Another mechanism by which matching may increase influence is by increasing the credibility of the matcher. However, whether matching or mismatching increases credibility may depend on whether the topic of the influence attempt is one of. Research in persuasion contexts shows that the likeability and credibility of the communicator affect persuasion only if the recipient of the communication is relatively uninvolved in the issue.
However, considerable attempts at social influence occur outside of direct persuasion contexts, and the likeability and credibility of the communicator may have more impact in these other contexts. Research on role playing in competitive negotiation settings indicates that verbalizing the other's position in the other's presence increases one's influence by leading the other to feel understood and thus enhancing trust. Similarly, NLP theory proposes that matching a client's PRS increases that client's trust in the therapist, which may augment the therapist's influence. However, the role playing research indicates that warm role playing, while it augments liking and trust, may undermine influence by making the other think he is winning.
This suggests that fostering liking and trust are not a sure road to influence in competitive interactions. One must also foster respect in the sense of a belief that one will not easily concede from one's essential position or allow oneself to be easily exploited. In the next section, we will consider the effects of matching in mixed-motive situations, in which both cooperation and competition are possible. Hence, the participants in the interactions discussed in this section will be ca1 leaf "parties" rather than "people.
These points will be discussed in the two main subsections of this section. The mechanisms by which reciprocity leads to influence are quite different from those by which substantive matching leads to influence. Hence, there will be very little overlap between the last section and this section. Much research has shown that this routine is highly effective in encouraging further cooperation from its target see Hulse, Egeth and Deese, Negotiation can be defined as any communication sequence that is designed to reach agreement on an issue or issues for which there is an initial divergence of interest.
The PD is a reward structure that is usually presented in matrix form. An abstract version of the PD is presented below on the left, and a numerical example is presented below on the right. The row prayer Is outcomes for each pair. The PD is paradoxical because actions that seem rational for a single party are self-defeating if both parties take them.
It should also be noted that the parties are dependent on each other in the PD, that is, the other party's cooperation has value for both parties. Two examples of the PD come to mind: 1 Two neighbors with different types of tools. Cooperative behavior C would be loaning a tool when needed, noncooperative behavior D would be failing to do so. Both parties are better off if they both loan tools R'Rt than if they both do not P,P'. However, there is a temptation T to borrow but not to loan, which, if successful, gives the other the worst possible outcome S.
The parties are better off if neither develops the system R. R' than if both do so P. But there is a temptation. The PD is a very common reward structure in real-life settings. Most ethical principles, e. We can define reciprocity in the PD as cooperating choosing C' in response to the other's cooperation C and failing to cooperate choosing D' in response to the other's noncooperation D. Another term for reciprocity is This strategy has been shown to be very effective for eliciting cooperation from the other.
Explanations for the Success of Reciprocity There is considerable danger in trying to generalize across learning, negotiation and PD settings, because these settings differ on many dimensions. One dimension is that negotiation and PD settings usually involve mutually acknowledged divergence of interest, while learning settings do not. Another dimension is that the parties are trying to reach agreement in negotiation, while they are not in learning and PD settings.
Nevertheless, these settings have many features in common, including the fact that reciprocity tends to encourage further cooperation. Hence, we will treat them together, while calling attention, from time to time, to possible differences. There are three types of explanation for the success of reciprocity in these settings, one in terms of automatic processes and the other two in terms of cognitions. The first explanation postulates some automatic reinforcement process that is outside cognitive awareness. This process, if it occurs, enhances the strength of responses that have been rewarded and diminishes the.
The second explanation is in terms of expectations. In one version of this explanation, these expectations concern the behavior reciprocated. In another version, they concern the strategist who is engaging in reciprocity. They are: a the strategist will cooperate if I cooperate and b the strategist will not cooperate if I fail to cooperate. The latter expectations should lead people to cooperate whenever they see that there is more to be gained from the strategist's cooperation than to be lost by cooperating with the strategist.
Another way to put this is that these expectations should lead people to cooperate whenever they regard mutual cooperation as more valuable than mutual noncooperation. Hence reciprocity is a rational strategy in the PD because it encourages the other to cooperated The third explanation see Komorita and Esser, ; McGillicuddy et al.
This leads them to cooperate with him in later settings because they expect to be rewarded if they do and not rewarded or punished if they do not. This explanation is similar to the second one in viewing expectations as the ultimate source of the target's cooperative behavior. It differs from the second explanation in its account of the origins of these expectations, postulating that they are produced by attributions about why the strategist was engaging in reciprocity rather than directly by his reciprocity.
Two efforts have been made to test the three explanations just given in the realm of negotiation. Both are damaging to the automatic reinforcement explanation. In the latter strategy, the confederate conceded when the other did not concede and failed to concede when the other did. There is some logic. In a second study McGillicuddy, Pruitt and Syna, , more concessions were made by negotiators who had previously watched their opponent follow a reciprocal strategy than those who had watched him concede rapidly or hardly at all.
These results cannot be explained by automatic reinforcement, since the subjects observed rather than experienced their opponent's reciprocity. Some cognitive process that involved an image of the opponent almost certainly was involved.
Auxiliary evidence suggests that this cognitive process may have involved attributions about the opponent. Opponents who followed a reciprocal strategy were rated as "stronger" than those who followed a soft strategy which involved making a concession on every trial.
They were also rated as "fairer' than those who followed a tough strategy which involved infrequent concession making. In conclusion, evidence in negotiation settings is unsupportive of an automatic reinforcement explanation for the success of reciprocity and supportive of an attributional explanation. It should be acknowledged, however, that the latter explanation is only viable in settings where the subject can develop a conception of the source of the reciprocity. Such a conception is not.
Hence, one of the other explanations e. Conditions Affecting the Success of Reciprocity Reciprocity is more effective in some conditions than others. For example, research on the PD by Kuhlman and Marshello suggests that reciprocity is most effective when the other party has an individualistic orientation, i. The alternatives to this orientation are a cooperative orientation, in which the other is concerned about the strategist's outcomes as well as her own, and a competitive orientation, in which the other is trying to do better than the strategist.
Two groups of researchers have found that reciprocity is counterproductive when the other has a cooperative orientation. This is presumably because reciprocating a cooperative person's occasional failure to cooperate amounts to overreacting to a temporary aberration. Evidence from a study by Clark and Mills suggests that reciprocity is resented in intimate relationships. A possible explanation for this finding is that the norm for intimate relationships.
Reciprocity is also ineffective when the other has a competitive orientation Kuhlman and Marshello, This is presumably because mutual cooperation tends to be of little interest to a competitive person. This is presumably because it is easier to perceive a relationship between one's behavior and the other's response when that relationship fits one's theories about cause and effect. The initial evidence for this assertion came from animal research showing that learning is much easier to establish for some connections between behavior and reward than for others.
For example, Garcia, McGowan and Green have shown that rats can readily be trained to avoid a new tasting food that is followed by gastrointestinal illness but not to avoid a new shaped food that produces the same illness. The unfamiliar shape, on the other hand, is more readily conditioned to the avoidance of electric shock than is the unfamiliar taste. For example, Evans- Pritchard described the Azende practice of treating. Presumably, this resemblance made the Azende much more alert to cases in which epileptic fits were relieved by this remedy than those in which they were not.
When moves are sequential, there is no way for the other to temporarily exploit the strategist--failing to cooperate yet enjoying the benefits of the strategist's cooperation until the strategists detects what is happening. Hence it should be especially clear to the other that he faces a choice between mutual cooperation and mutual noncooperation. An example would be the familiar case where a tenant the other must pay the rent before the landlord the strategist allows him to move in.
The landlord is less likely to be paid if the tenant moves in first or even if they take action simultaneously. In summary, reciprocity is especially effective in eliciting cooperative behavior from another party when that party is trying to maximize her outcomes, sees a logical link between the behavior in question and the reward or punishment that follows it, and takes action before that taken by the strategist rather than moving simultaneously with the strategist.
Some of these are also supported in research on negotiation and the PD. After that, it is useful to lengthen the interval between the desired response and the administration of reward or punishment. If it is necessary to delay reinforcement at the outset of conditioning, it may be possible to substitute a symbol of the reward or punishment, for example, a verbal promise to give a child candy after dinner in exchange for straightening her room. For maximal effectiveness, such a symbol must be periodically followed by administration of the actual reward or punishment Huise et al.
Consistency Many learning studies have shown that consistent reciprocity is more effective for establishing response than irregular or periodic reciprocity. This effect has also been shown in research on negotiation. A possible explanation for this effect is that reward and punishment tend to be reciprocated by the target as well as to reinforce the target's behavior. Hence, if the strategist is going to be inconsistent, it is better to be light on punishment and thus to diminish provocation of the other than to be light on reward and thus fail to build up positive credit with the other.
Hence, some experts e. One needs to praise a child every time he cleans up his room, at first; but after a while, periodic praise will suffice. The finding that inconsistent reciprocity makes responses more hardy is a standard result in learning studies, but it was not replicated in a PD study Tedeschi et al. Again, the rule is different if hardiness is at issue. Provided that they are large enough to produce J earning, smaller rewards will encourage greater persistence once reciprocity is discontinued Huise et al.
One possible explanation for this latter effect is that smaller rewards make the other experience greater dissonance if the other enacts the response. The case for large incentives is less clear for punishment. Findings on humans by Lindskold suggest that the most effective punishment is that which exactly "fits the crime," neither undermatching nor overmatching the other's level of noncooperation. Such a penalty is as large as possible without seeming unfair. There are arguments for and against gradually increasing punishment in response to noncooperation.
This is because people often habituate to punishment, learning to live with it. However, there are arguments for gradually increasing punishment which may sometimes mitigate this advice. For example, gradual increase allows one to explore for side effects.
Gradual increase may also seem more legitimate to the target or to third party observers. Hence, gradual increase may make more sense when side effects or legitimacy are at issue. The more prior cooperation, the stronger was the effect up to 10 trials in the condition that went the longest. Clear vs. FUZZY Events For reciprocity to be effective in producing later cooperation, it is necessary for clearcut behavior by the target to be followed by a clearcut response from the strategist.
If one or both events are fuzzy, lacking a definite time and place or hard to distinguish from everyday experience, the target may not notice the connection and, hence, learn nothing.
Enhancing Human Performance Issues, Theories, and Techniques
Nonreward and nonpunishment tend to be fuzzy events, especially when there is little experience with their opposite. Hence, reciprocity may be ineffective when a desired target behavior is followed by nonpunishment or an undesired behavior by nonreward. It follows that a strategist who is trying to establish a new response should usually reward that response and fail to reward or punish its nonoccurrence. If trying to suppress an old response,. When possible, threats of punishment should usually be substituted for actual punishment, because if they work they do not require that the other party be hurt.
Summary Research on instrumental conditioning suggests that the prescription for establishing a new response by rewarding reciprocating this response is quite different from that for maintaining the response once established. For establishing a response, reward should be immediate, consistent and sizable. But quite the opposite is true if one wants a hardy response that will hold up in the absence of continuous reward. The usual solution to this conundrum. Another useful technique is to give the individual a prior experience with the reward before beginning a reciprocal strategy.
If one is trying to suppress a response, punishment is usually more effective than reward because it tends to link a clearcut response the one to be suppressed with a clearcut incentive the penalty. Again, there is merit in employing immediate, consistent and sizable penalties, but this point must be qualified by the possibility of side effects. When side effects are likely, careful monitoring is needed. A policy of gradually increasing the size of the punishment may be needed in such a situation.
Many of the same findings have been obtained in research on establishing cooperative behavior in negotiation and the PD. However, not all the findings on conditioning extend to this arena. Hence, we must be careful about generalizing too readily from the conditioning literature. Defects in the Strategy of Reciprocity A major defect in the strategy of reciprocity is that it tends to produce and perpetuate mutual noncooperation.
If the other party fails to cooperate even once, the. The other will then often counter-retaliate, producing further retaliation by the strategist, etc.
File - Enhancing Human Performance Issues Theories And Techniques - pudazyjy.cf
In this way, the parties become locked into a pattern of mutual noncooperation. The problem is most insidious if the other party fails to cooperate at the beginning of the interaction, because the other then gains no experience whatsoever with the strategist's willingness to reciprocate cooperation and thus misses an essential part of the message. Moreover, there may still be a perceptual problem even if the other has initially cooperated before switching to noncooperation.
The other may then retaliate, forcing the strategist to provide further punishment in what becomes a vicious circle. There are two kinds of remedies for these problems. One is to adopt some variant of reciprocity that is less likely to produce a locked in state. The other is to employ a "starting mechanism" once mutual noncooperation has set in.
These will be discussed below. One requires the strategist to be slow to retaliate and also slow to forgive. In a PD study by Bixenstine and. A possible explanation for the success of the slow-slow strategy is as follows. If the strategist is slow to retaliate, this allows the other party to make an occasional error without running an undue risk of escalation. The other gets a second chance to correct such errors before becoming the victim of an escalative retaliation.
Delaying retaliation may also make it clearer to the other party that she rather than the strategist initiated noncooperation. However, there is a problem with slow retaliation if it is coupled with fast forgiveness in a ''quick-slow" strategy , that is, if the other can redeem herself by a single cooperative action. The other may learn that it is possible to exploit the strategist's good will until he retaliates and then quickly get back into his good graces with a single act of cooperation so as to set him up for a new round of.
The solution, is to be slow to retaliate and slow to forgive. Once the other has antagonized the strategist to the point of retaliation, the slow-slow strategy makes it hard for the other to redeem herself. The other must cooperate several times before the strategist will resume cooperation. A second approach would be for the strategist to be slow to punish and fast to forgive but to warn the other verbally that punishment will be faster the next time the other steps out of line.
There is no research on this approach, which involves a mixture of actions and words, but it seems to make sense. A third strategy, which has received research support, is to precede reciprocity with a period of unconditional cooperation. Komorita and Mechling have shown that this encourages the other to cooperate. Earlier we interpreted this effect as due to the other party's becoming aware of how useful it is to have the strategist cooperate.
A second possible interpretation is that the initial unconditional reward encourages the other to cooperate; hence, the other has a chance to learn that his cooperation will be reciprocated. A third possibility is that providing early reward gives the strategist idiosyncrasy credits that permit her to punish the other for noncooperation on a later occasion without evoking the other Is retaliation.
Once these have been enacted, one can then turn to reciprocity in order to encourage the other to continue responding in the desired fashion. If the desired action is not in the other's repertoire, a shaping routine may be employed. This involves reinforcing a sequence of actions that look more and more like the behavior desired Hulse et al. Verbal instruction or modeling may also be used in such a circumstance. Alternatively, the desired action may be in the other's repertoire but be of low probability--a relatively rare response that will not be emitted in the normal course of events.
For example, if one wants to reinforce smiling in an ordinarily sour person, one could show him cartoons from time to time. If the parties can talk to each other, it may also be possible for them to coordinate mutual cooperation through negotiation, though this requires some element of trust. If trust is too low for genuine negotiation to take place, it. In cases of even greater distrust, it may be essential for one of the parties to take a dramatic unilateral initiative to enhance the other's trust. Such initiatives will be discussed in the section on inducing reciprocity.
Summary Strict reciprocity has a major defect as a strategy in that it often encourages the development of mutual noncooperation and it provides no way to escape from this state of affairs. A modified form of reciprocity, in which the strategist is both slow to retaliate and slow to reinstate after retaliation appears to be superior to strict reciprocity. Inducing Reciprocity by Taking Unilateral Initiatives If people are ready to reciprocate, one of the best ways to influence them is to provide them rewards. Reciprocity has been shown in a number of different types of behavior including helping Depaulo et al.
Cialdini has discussed at length how reciprocity can be used to influence others or obtain goods from them. Rewarding people in an effort to induce reciprocity often serves as a starting mechanism for escaping mutual noncooperation. Such actions are sometimes called unilateral initiatives in the tradition of Osgood's , GRIT proposals.
When a relationship is severely escalated, such initiatives are often more successful than negotiation. This is because words tend to be suspect since they can be used to trick and since each party is likely to question whether the other will actually follow through on its promises Lebow and Stein, in press. Hence, the strategist must turn to actions, which often "speak louder than words. When it occurs, it can be explained by a number of mechanisms, including the following: Normative Pressures A norm of reciprocity is found in all cultures and is probably essential to the survival of the social system.
The norm of reciprocity may well be derived from the equity norm, which asserts that people should be rewarded in proportion to their merit. Their generosity is not necessarily directed at the source of the favor; anyone can be the beneficiary. Encouraging Trust A belief that the source of the initiative is seeking a more positive relationship and. Encouraging Dependency The other discovers how valuable one's cooperative initiatives are and seeks to keep them coming by taking cooperative initiatives of his own.
Mobilizing Third-party Pressures Third parties who are trying to resolve a controversy tend to encourage reciprocity, because they believe it will move the controversy toward agreement and will encourage further concessions. Conditions Encouraging Reciprocity Reciprocity of unilateral initiatives is more likely and more extensive under some circumstances than others. Intimacy and Similarity Clark and Mills argue that reciprocity is normative in nonintimate relationships but nonnormative in intimate relationships.
Hence, favors will tend to be reciprocated in the former but not the latter. However, it seems likely that we are dealing with perceived similarity rather than intimacy in this study. The finding suggests that people who are similar to each other may be especially likely to reciprocate one another's favors, in an effort to develop a relationship. Attributions of Genuineness The likelihood and extent of reciprocity are also influenced by attributions about the motives underlying one's initiatives.
This proposition is supported by the finding that unilateral initiatives are most likely to be reciprocated when the strategist is more powerful has more threat capacity than the target, next best when the two parties are equal in power, and worst when the target is more powerful than the strategist Lindskold and Bennett, ; Michener, et al. The point is that more powerful people do not need to be generous in order to gain influence. Hence, their generous. Presumably, greater cost makes generous behavior seem more genuine.
This mechanism may have helped Sadat gain the trust of the people of Israel during his trip to Jerusalem. The costs he obviously bore in terms of loss of support at home and in the Arab worlds gave him particular credibility. A related source of credibility may have been the fact that his trip, once made, was irreversible Lebow and Stein, in press. Salience and Clarity of the Initiative It also seems reasonable to assume that more noticeable unilateral initiatives will be more fully reciprocated. Unexpected actions, such as Sadatts trip to Jerusalem, tend to be especially salient, standing out as figure against ground.
Furthermore, action is usually more salient than inaction. Hence, a party will usually get more credit for taking helpful actions than for failing to take harmful ones. However, a villain seems to get more credit for not being villainous the more experience people have had with his villainy.
This point has been observed with hostage takers, who are apparently given more credit for being normally generous the longer their victim has been a hostage. Such an explanation contributes to both salience and clarity of purpose, averting other interpretations such as the notion that the initiative is an effort at ingratiation or a sign of weakness. A Cognitive Model Other useful hypotheses are suggested by a model that is based on the two cognitive explanations for the success of reciprocity that were presented at the beginning of the prior section.
According to this model, people will cooperate with us if three conditions are met: 1 They believe that we will cooperate with them if they cooperate with us, that is, they trust us. This may result from viewing us as "conciliatory" or "fair. Hence, the model implies that the second. This may help explain why initiatives by more powerful parties tend to be more fully reciprocated Lindskold and Bennett, ; Michener et al.
These findings were interpreted earlier in terms of attributions. But it is also possible that people believe that they cannot exploit powerful others condition 2 and hence are ready to reciprocate their cooperative initiatives. They realize that they must play ball with powerful parties because the latter cannot be pushed into unilateral cooperation. Hence it is necessary to reciprocate that party's initiatives in order to gain his cooperation. Reciprocity is also greater when people expect future interaction with the source of the unilateral initiative than when such interaction is not expected Gruder, ; Marlowe et al.
A possible explanation is that the expectation of future interaction causes them to value that person's cooperation condition 3 , making them more prone to reinforce this cooperation when it occurs. Their dependence on the other may also make it seem advisable to. PD's are often represented in consciousness in decomposed form.
A value to self and other is placed on each party's possible actions, but no thought is given to the combined impact of the two parties' actions. When this is true, the same basic PD can sometimes be decomposed in two different ways: one in which each party appears to control the other's best outcomes and one in which the other appears to control them himself.
Research Pruitt, suggests that reciprocity is more common in the former than the latter condition. Reciprocating the other's initiatives is a way to do this. Cost of Continued Conflict When people are dependent on us and believe that we will not cooperate unilaterally, they are likely to want to shift to mutual cooperation.
This desire should be especially strong when conflict is unrewarding and there are costs of continued conflict. Hence, they should be particularly prone to reciprocate our unilateral initiatives. Another way to put this is that unilateral initiatives are most effective when the target is experiencing a "hurting stalemate" the term comes from Touval and Zartman, , unable to push us into. Evidence for this assertion is anecdotal but interesting. Sadat's trip to Jerusalem followed a war between Egypt and Israel which must have created a sense that continued conflict was both futile and dangerous.
Likewise, a successful series of unilateral initiatives aimed at the Soviet Union by President Kennedy in came soon after the Cuban Missile Crisis. One guideline is to concede from strength. Political analysts often talk about negotiating from strength, and there is some truth to the notion that people will yield to a party that has threat capacity. But there usually are limits to how much can be accomplished by threats. Further concessions beyond these limits can be achieved if the stronger party is willing to take conciliatory initiatives, that is to concede from strength.
A second guideline is to arrange for one's constituents to adopt a tough line in public, in contrast to the conciliatory initiatives one is taking. This tactic is sometimes called the "black hat-white hat routine. A fourth is to explain why one is taking conciliatory initiatives. A fifth is to choose initiatives that involve some cost to oneself.
A sixth is to arrange for future interaction with the party to be influenced. A seventh is to take one's initiatives at a point when the other party is in a hurting stalemate. Osgood , and Lindskold have suggested four other elements of strategy that may increase the effectiveness of unilateral initiatives: a Take a series of unilateral initiatives over a period of time without requiring reciprocity from the other party.
This makes the conciliatory message more credible and gives the other time to rethink his approach. These suggestions make sense, though research evidence for them is not substantial at this time. The first is that reciprocity can be a strategy for influencing other people. This is particularly true when the others have an individualistic orientation and a causal schema that links their behavior to our action, when their actions and ours are clearcut and sequential, and when our responses to their actions are immediate, consistent, and large.
The second is that we can sometimes influence other people by taking positive, unilateral initiatives--that is, by doing them favors in the hope that they will reciprocate. Such initiatives are particularly likely to work when they are costly to ourselves, when they are salient and clearly explained, when we are seen as genuinely interested in the other people's welfare, when we seem powerful and firm in defense of our larger interests, when the others are dependent on us in the future, and when continued conflict is unrewarding and costly to them.
A major problem with the strategy of reciprocity is that our retaliation in the face of failure to cooperate may foster a vicious circle. The strategy of reciprocity provides no method of escaping from such a circle. A way out of this circle is to take positive unilateral initiatives with the hope that the others will reciprocate. Such initiatives are especially likely to work under the conditions mentioned in the last paragraph.
A cognitive model is useful for interpreting some of the findings on reciprocity. This holds that others will cooperate when they hold three expectations about us: a we will cooperate if they cooperate, b we will not cooperate unilaterally, and c our cooperation is desirable. Our reciprocity tends to produce the first and second expectations. In addition, favors from us tend to produce the first expectation, resulting in reciprocal favors when we are also perceived as strong producing the second expectation and when others are dependent on us producing the third expectation.
The three expectations just enumerated can be produced in other ways than by reciprocity and favor doing. For example, receipt of a message indicating cooperative intent from a powerful person should produce the first and second expectations, leading to cooperation. It follows that this cognitive model should have broad application.
There is also a social norm requiring that favors be reciprocated. Like any norm that benefits our interests, others are more likely to follow this norm when we are powerful and are attending to what they are doing. This provides an alternative interpretation for the finding that people tend to reciprocate our favors when they are dependent on us.
The fact that such reciprocity is more. Both contribute to influence but by very different intervening processes: substantive matching by its effect on attraction and communicator credibility, reciprocity by its effect on expectations and attributions. At some later time, it may be possible to state a relationship between these intervening processes and hence between our two topics see point 6 below for some initial thoughts along these lines.
But current theory and research are not very helpful for this purpose. We end with a discussion of research frontiers. In the realm of substantive matching, the following projects seem to have merit: 1 Studies by Chaiken and Petty et al. Research is needed. For example, are eye contact and role reversal only effective when involvement is low? One of dominance. We suggest that the former mechanism may be more common in cooperative settings and the latter in competitive settings. But is this really the case? Does accurate role reversal lead to influence in noncompetitive settings? Does warm role reversal undermine influence as found by Johnson or enhance it as we suspect in such settings?
Do people have a preferred representational system PRS? If so, what are the best indicators of this system? Do these procedures only work with right-handed people? Can therapists learn to do this matching? If at all possible, these studies should be done in therapeutic settings rather than in the laboratory with undergraduates.
But these states differ, and they need to be pulled apart in research. Doing so might help to forge a link between the material presented in the two parts of our paper, because respect is close to a view of the other as "strong" and trust is close to a view of the other as "fair," attributions that appear in the cognitive model presented in the last section and play different roles in that model.
In the realm of reciprocity, the following projects seem worth doing: 7 Much more research is needed about the impact of reciprocity and favor doing on expectations and attributions about the actor. Most of the research on these phenomena in human settings has not been theory driven and has not attempted to measure intervening psychological states. An exception is the study of attributions in negotiation by McGillicuddy et al. Do people who have had experience with particular linkages between behavior and reinforcement learn more readily when these linkages reappear?
Animal research e. This research needs to be extended into competitive situations such as those embodied in negotiation and the PD. In particular, the impact of these variables on hardiness of response should be examined in competitive settings. In particular, we need research on the conditions under which it is more effective to start punishment at full strength as opposed to increasing it gradually.
Such warnings, if credible, should have the desired impact on attributions and expectations without producing the negative side-effects often associated with actual punishment. Such warnings may also help the target understand her own role in provoking punishment if the strategist is provoked into using it. Hence, the target may be less likely to retaliate i f punishment is used. This idea suggests that short-term balancing of accounts is less. But is this also true for long-term balancing of accounts?
If I do ten favors for you in an intimate relationship, are you as unlikely to reciprocate as if I do only one? Or will you reciprocate for fear that I may decide that I am making too much of a contribution to the relationship? But the mechanism for this effect remains speculative. Is it because favors from a powerful other seem genuine? Or is it because such favors are unlikely to be interpreted as a sign of weakness and hence of readiness to continue unilateral cooperation? Studies are needed on these issues. Clearly there is a great deal more to be learned in this area.
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Ingratiation: A social psychological analysis. Toward a general theory of strategic self-presentation. Suis Ed. Ingratiation: An attributions approach. Katz, E. Stock Image. New Condition: New Soft cover. Save for Later. About this Item Language: English. Brand new Book. About this title Synopsis: In its evaluation, Enhancing Human Performance reviews the relevant materials, describes each technique, makes recommendations in some cases for further scientific research and investigation, and notes applications in military and industrial settings.
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